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1 Introduction
Beliefs come in degrees, or so it seems. Assuming they do, one important question
concerns the basis of their numerical representation. It is typical to represent the varying
strengths with which propositions might be believed using percentages, or real values
between 0 and 1, or with intervals thereof. Moreover, it’s typical to assume that these
numbers encode more than merely ordinal information. For instance, it seems that we can
meaningfully talk about intervals of strengths of belief: an agent—let’s call her α—might
believe one proposition much more than she believes another, or she might believe it just
a little more. Likewise for ratios: if α is 50% confident that the coin she flips will land
heads, then most of us would be happy to say that she has half as much confidence in
that event than she has in the coin landing either heads or tails. And, if she’s even a
little bit rational, then she’ll probably be at least twice as confident that it’ll land heads
on the next toss than that it’ll land heads consistently on the next several tosses.
There is, in other words, a widespread prima facie commitment in our understanding
of degrees of belief that they can be measured on a ratio scale, or something much like it.
Given this, we’ll assume for the remainder of this paper that the numbers we use to
represent the strengths of our beliefs can, at least in principle, carry cardinal (read: at
least ratio and therefore also interval) information. Supposing that’s correct, it’s just the
sort of thing that ought to be explained by any adequate account of what degrees of
belief are. We don’t get to posit cardinality for free—α’s doxastic states don’t come with
little numbers attached to them, and they don’t literally stand in numerical relationships
with one another. Rather, they must have some non-numerical structure that is in some
way similar to and hence representable by the real values in the unit interval, and in
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particular such that both the ordinal and relevant cardinal properties of and relations
between those numbers represent something doxastically meaningful. That much is clear
enough—the hard part consists in saying exactly what that structure is.
So how is it that we manage to get from the purely non-numerical stuff in our heads
through to numerical representations of our doxastic states that encode interesting
cardinal information? A few answers to this question have been suggested. One
long-standing tradition seeks to explain where the numbers come from and how they get
their meaning by considering how beliefs interact with preferences (e.g., Ramsey 1931).
Others have tried to extract numerical representations out of comparative expectations, a
special kind of non-propositional comparative attitude (e.g., Suppes and Zanotti 1976).
Still other potential approaches have yet to be explored. For instance, if you like the idea
that degrees of belief are really just outright beliefs about objective probabilities, then
you might think that whatever cardinality they possess is derivative upon the cardinal
information possessed by those probabilities—wherever that comes from.
I’m inclined to think that each of these possibilities are worth considering seriously;
at least, none of them seem to me either obviously correct, or irretrievably hopeless. I
have argued elsewhere that the connection with preferences is one promising avenue to
explore (Elliott 2019a). But in this paper I want to focus on an entirely different kind of
approach: comparativism.
For the sake of concreteness, I’ll take comparativism to be the view that the facts
about an agent’s degrees of belief supervene on, and indeed hold in virtue of, the facts
about what we’ll call her confidence comparisons. These are purely ordinal comparative
doxastic states such as being more confident that P than that Q, being equally confident
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that P as that Q, or being at least as confident that P as that Q.1 With that as their
starting point, comparativists tend to see degrees of belief and the numerical
representations thereof as a kind of theoretical tool, a way to represent and reason about
sufficiently coherent systems of comparative confidence. Or to put that another way: the
numbers we use to represent our beliefs ultimately describe a purely ordinal structure
imposed over a set of propositions by our confidence comparisons, when those
comparisons satisfy some minimum threshold of coherence.
On the face of it, comparativism might seem to struggle with providing any
plausible explanation of the possibility of cardinal information. After all, individual
confidence comparisons contain no more than purely ordinal information, so how could a
system composed of nothing more than such comparisons possess anything more than
1It won’t matter too much for what I have to say exactly how we define ‘comparativism’,
and there of course are many other ways to precisify the general kind of idea that I’m re-
ferring to. Most actual comparativists have taken a view which is at least in the vicinity of
what I below characterise as probabilistic comparativism; e.g., (de Finetti, 1931), (Koop-
man, 1940), (Savage, 1954, Ch. 3), (Fine 1973, 68ff), (Hawthorne, 2016) and (Stefa´nsson,
2016, 2018); comparativist theories along these lines are also discussed in (Fishburn, 1986)
and (Krantz et al. 1971, 200). In some cases, a comparativist might focus on quarternary
confidence comparisons (e.g., being more confident that P given Q than that R given S),
rather than on binary comparisons like those I’ve described here. For the sake of brevity,
I’ve limited my discussion to the relatively simple views which consider only binary con-
fidence comparisons. Nevertheless, each of the main points of discussion in §§3–§4 have
fairly straightforward analogues for the typical case of the quarternary comparativist.
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that?2 Nevertheless, comparativists have what is by now a standard explanation of how
cardinality can be generated out of nothing more than ordinal confidence comparisons.
By drawing on a well-worn analogy with the measurement of mass, length, and other
extensive quantities, comparativists have managed to set down conditions (or axioms)
under which meaningful cardinal information might be extracted out of a system of
confidence comparisons.
That is the current state of play. However, the axioms to which comparativists
typically appeal when addressing this kind of challenge are quite strong indeed.
Essentially, they impose a comparative variety of probabilistic (and hence logical)
coherence on the agents’ confidence comparisons. And this is a key limitation with the
view in its most typical contemporary form: it lacks an adequate account of how
ordinary agents—who do not live up to the very strict standards of probabilistic
coherence—might nevertheless have beliefs which carry genuine cardinal information.
Consequently, in this paper I want to explore whether, and how, the standard
‘probabilistic’ axioms might be weakened, while maintaining the same basic strategy for
extracting cardinality out of a system of comparative confidences.
Let me say that again, for emphasis: the goal here is to explore whether, and to
what extent, the usual probabilistic axioms can be weakened. This is a question of
interest to proponents and opponents of comparativism alike, and for those who might
be on the fence. I stress however that my results are formal, not evaluative. The present
paper is not intended to be a defence of comparativism. (It would be woefully
inadequate if so!) An evaluation of the overall merits and demerits of the comparativists’
2For a recent complaint along just these lines, see (Meacham and Weisberg 2011, 659).
5
view is well beyond the scope of this discussion, and I won’t try to address the tricky
empirical question of whether and to what extent the weakened axioms are satisfied or
even approximated by ordinary agents. Still less is this a paper on what our comparative
confidences should be like, so I will not have anything much to say about how Ramseyan
comparativism relates to arguments for probabilism.
I will begin my discussion by reviewing the standard account of how mass can be
measured on a ratio scale, and how probabilistic comparativism posits an essentially
similar process for the measurement of belief (§§2–3). Following that, I’ll discuss in a
little more detail the motivations for seeking more general axioms under which
cardinality can be extracted out of a system of confidence comparisons (§4). Finally, I
will show that the axioms of what I’ll call probabilistic comparativism can be weakened
to a significant extent—though, not without limits. I will do this by developing what I
call Ramseyan comparativism (§5). Moreover, I will show that the Ramseyan axioms on
confidence comparisons are in one important respect maximally weak: inasmuch as
comparativists want to retain the analogy with the measurement of mass as it’s usually
understood, the Ramseyan axioms are as weak as they come.
2 The Measurement of Mass
Let a and b be any two concrete objects you like, and compare:
Ordinal. a is more massive than b
Cardinal. a is twice as massive as b
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Cardinal obviously contains more information than Ordinal, and that information
has to come from somewhere. Yet masses don’t come with little numbers attached to
them. Whatever it is that explains the extra information in Cardinal must ultimately
be non-numerical in nature. So how can we get from the non-numerical facts on the
ground through to numerical masses that encode interesting cardinal information?
The representational theory of measurement gives us a plausible answer.3 First, note
that Cardinal is true (roughly) if and only if, if you were to take two disjoint objects
each as massive as b (call them b1 and b2, b’s duplicates) and join them together, then
the resulting object would be just as massive as a. Call the operation of joining objects
together concatenation; we assume that no mass is gained or lost in the act of
concatenating. Given this, it’s plausible that there’s nothing more to the truth of a claim
like Cardinal than what we’ve just said—that is, ‘a is twice as massive as b’ just means
something roughly to the effect of ‘a is as massive as the concatenation of two duplicates
of b.’ By reference, then, to purely ordinal comparisons between duplicates and the
concatenations thereof, we’ve been able to give straightforward non-numerical meaning
to Cardinal.
And we can easily generalise this idea to explain other rational ratio comparisons.
For positive integers n,m, say that a is n/m times as massive as b whenever there’s some
object c such that
1. a is as massive as the concatenation of n duplicates of c, and
2. b is as massive as the concatenation of m duplicates of c.
3The locus classicus for this theory is (Krantz et al., 1971).
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Now let x designate c’s mass in whatever units you like—let’s say slugs (∼14.6 kg).
Intuitively, a must then have a mass of n · x slugs, and b must have a mass of m · x slugs.
Hence, a is n/m times as massive as b. Indeed, with a little bit more work, we can
generalise the idea even further to explain arbitrary real ratio comparisons. However, for
the sake of simplicity we’ll stick with rational ratios throughout this discussion.
Hiding in the background is a crucial empirical assumption: that the operation of
concatenation behaves as a kind of non-numerical analogue of addition. We rely on
exactly this assumption to move from, e.g., ‘a is as massive as the concatenation of n
duplicates of an object with a mass of x slugs’ to ‘a has a mass of n · x slugs’—that is,
we assume that the mass of a concatenation is just the sum of the masses of the
concatenands. (Imagine if, instead, concatenation behaved like quaddition: whenever you
concatenate up to 57 duplicates together, things are as usual; but concatenate more and
the result is always as massive as 5 duplicates. We could have then used concatenations
to define our way up to one object’s being 57 times as massive than another, but no
further.)
Fortunately, the analogy between concatenation and addition is quite close. Where
a %m b iff a is at least as massive as b,
a ∼m b iff a is exactly as massive as b,
a⊕ b = the concatenation of a and b,
then it’s plausible that %m is transitive and complete, and ∼m is its symmetric part.
Furthermore, ⊕ behaves with respect to %m a lot like + behaves with respect to ≥: for
all disjoint objects a, b, c,
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1. a⊕ b %m b
2. a⊕ b ∼m b⊕ a
3. a⊕ (b⊕ c) ∼m (a⊕ b)⊕ c
4. a %m b iff a⊕ c %m b⊕ c
Now compare these with the following properties of + in relation to ≥, where n and m
are non-negative real numbers:
1. n+m ≥ m
2. n+m = m+ n
3. n+ (m+ k) = (n+m) + k
4. n ≥ m iff, for any k, n+ k ≥ m+ k
Indeed, if we posit a rich enough space of concrete objects and make one further
‘Archimedean’ assumption—roughly: that no object is infinitely more massive than any
other—then we can say something stronger still: if O is the set of ∼m -equivalence classes
of concrete objects and R+ the positive reals, then the relational system 〈O,%m ,⊕〉 has
essentially the same structure as 〈R+,≥,+〉. Thus, we can assign a number to each
object in such a way that %m is represented by ≥, and ⊕ is represented by +. And with
that in hand, we can start to define up ratios of masses, numerical differences in mass,
ratios of differences in mass, and so on. In other words, we have all the basic resources
needed to explain how numerical representations of mass manage to carry all sorts of
interesting cardinal information.
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The upshot: numerical masses represent a fully non-numerical system of ordinal
mass comparisons which have an ‘additive’ structure over concatenations. We’re justified
in treating ratios of masses as meaningful because there exists an operation on objects
that is intuitively and formally like ‘adding’ masses together. And we can apply the same
basic idea outlined here to account for the measurement of other (extensive) quantities: a
is twice as long as b iff a is as long as two length-duplicates of b laid end-to-end; a has
twice the volume of b iff a has the same volume as two volume-duplicates of b joined
together; and an event e1 has twice the duration of e2 iff e1 can be split into two disjoint
events with the same duration as e2.
To apply the same idea to the measurement of beliefs, comparativists have therefore
historically sought an operation on the relata of confidence comparisons (i.e.,
propositions) that behaves, with respect to those comparisons, similarly enough to
addition to justify treating it as a non-numerical analogue thereof. As Krantz et al. put
it, the strategy is ‘to treat the assignment of [subjective] probabilities as a measurement
problem of the same fundamental character as the measurement of, e.g., mass or
duration’ (1971, p. 200). So let’s see how that plays out in practice.
3 Probabilistic Comparativism
In this section I’ll provide an overview of probabilistic comparativism. I’ll begin by
laying out some basic notation and assumptions (§3.1), followed by the mathematical
underpinnings of the view (§3.2). Finally, I’ll define two specific varieties of probabilistic
comparativism—one ‘precise’ (§3.3), and the other ‘imprecise’ (§3.4).
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3.1 Notation and assumptions
Let α be an arbitrary thinking subject whose beliefs we are trying to represent. I will
assume that the propositions regarding which α has beliefs can be modelled as subsets of
some space of logically possible worlds, Ω. By ‘logically possible’, I mean no more than
that the worlds are closed under a consequence relation at least as strong as that of
classical propositional logic. So, you can assume that Ω includes metaphysically or even
epistemically impossible worlds, if that’s what floats your boat—as long as the worlds
are classically logically consistent. (I’ll talk more about this assumption in §4.)
Next, let B ⊆ ℘(Ω) denote that set of propositions regarding which α has beliefs.
Without loss of generality, I’ll assume throughout that B is a Boolean algebra of sets on
Ω. So, B contains at least Ω and ∅, and it’s closed under relative complements and
binary intersections/unions. I’ll also assume throughout that B is finite. Doing this will
simplify much of the ensuing discussion and formalities.4
I’ll assume that α’s full system of confidence comparisons can be modelled with a
single binary relation % defined over B, where
P % Q iff α believes P at least as much as she believes Q
4The finitude of B plays a minor (simplifying) role in relation to Theorem 1. We can
do without it if we instead make use of a more complicated version of Definition 5. The
finiteness assumption also plays a role in the existence proof of Theorem 2. Where B is
uncountable, additional ‘continuity’ assumptions can be placed on the comparative con-
fidence relation which will guarantee the existence of the relevant type of representation.
See (Evren and Ok, 2011) for discussion on these types of conditions.
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I’ll refer to % as α’s confidence ranking. Consequently, where  and ∼ stand for the
comparatives more probable and equally probable respectively, I am in effect assuming
that
P ∼ Q iff (P % Q) & (Q % P )
P  Q iff (P % Q) &¬(Q % P )
Nothing about this last assumption should be treated as obvious or trivial. For example,
α might be at least as confident in P as in Q without being more confident in P than in
Q, or without being equally confident in P as in Q. Nevertheless, it will simplify the
discussion, and nothing of great importance will hang on it.
Finally, where a function Cr assigns real numbers to the propositions in B, I’ll say
that Cr almost agrees with % iff, for all P,Q ∈ B,
P % Q only if Cr(P ) ≥ Cr(Q);
and we’ll say that Cr agrees with % just in case
P % Q iff Cr(P ) ≥ Cr(Q).
For ease of expression, I’ll treat agreement (but not almost agreement) as symmetric: %
agrees with Cr just in case Cr agrees with %.
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3.2 Agreeing with probabilities
Any Cr that agrees with confidence comparisons % is ipso facto at least an ordinal-scale
representation of %. Our task now is to lay out axioms under which such a function can
be said to also carry cardinal information. This is where probabilities come in handy:
Definition 1. Cr : B 7→ R is a probability function iff, ∀P,Q ∈ B,
1. Cr(Ω) = 1,
2. Cr(P ) ≥ 0, and
3. If P ∩Q = ∅, then Cr(P ∪Q) = Cr(P ) + Cr(Q)
It follows immediately from the third criterion that if some probability function—any
probability function—agrees with %, then the union of disjoint sets is to % just as ⊕ is
to %m , or as + is to ≥. Great! That’s exactly the kind of thing needed for the analogy
with the measurement of mass to hold water.
Moreover, we have known for a long time the exact conditions under which a
confidence ranking will agree with some probability function on B. The following five
axioms are individually necessary and jointly sufficient (see Scott 1964). For all
P,Q,R ∈ B,
Completeness. P % Q or Q % P
Preorder. (i) P % P , and (ii) if P % Q and Q % R, then P % R
Non-Triviality. Ω  ∅
Non-Negativity. P % ∅
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Scott’s Axiom. Where 1P denotes the indicator function of P , (Pi)
n
i=1 and (Qi)
n
i=1 are
finite sequences of propositions, and (ki)
n
i=1 is a finite sequence of natural numbers,
then if
1.
∑n
i=1 ki · 1Pi(ω) =
∑n
i=1 ki · 1Qi(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω, and
2. Pi % Qi, for i = 1, . . . , n− 1,
then Qn % Pn
Call the conjunction of the above five axioms the Complete Package.5
Comparativists have frequently suggested that, when % conforms to the Complete
Package, beliefs can be measured on a ratio scale with the union of disjoint sets
playing the role of concatenation (e.g., Fine 1973, 68ff; Stefa´nsson 2016, 2018).
It is possible to say something a little more general than this, though, and doing so
will be useful in demonstrating a general continuity between probabilistic comparativism
and the Ramseyan comparativisms that I’ll develop below. First, note that if Cr is a
probability function, then if Cr(P ∩Q) = 0, then Cr(P ∪Q) = Cr(P ) + Cr(Q). That is to
say: probability functions are also additive with respect to the union of what we’ll call
pseudodisjoint propositions, where P and Q are pseudodisjoint for α just in case she has
no confidence in their intersection. Or, more precisely,
Definition 2. For all P ∈ B, P is:
5In the context of the other axioms, Preorder is redundant, and Scott’s Axiom is
equivalent to the slightly weaker formulation found in (Scott, 1964) (see Harrison-Trainor
et al. 2016). I’ve done it this way to make later discussions easier.
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1. minimal iff Q % P for all Q ∈ B,
2. maximal iff P % Q for all Q ∈ B,
3. middling iff P is neither minimal nor maximal
Definition 3. P ⊆ B is a set of pseudodisjoint propositions iff, for any minimal Q and
any P? ⊆ P such that |P?| ≥ 2, ⋂P? ∼ Q; furthermore, propositions P1, . . . , Pn are
pairwise pseudodisjoint iff there’s a set of pseudodisjoint propositions P such that
P1, . . . , Pn ∈ P
Assuming that α has exactly zero confidence in P whenever P is minimal, Definition 3
plausibly characterise in comparativist terms what it is for α to believe that at most one
proposition from P1, . . . , Pn is true.
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With all that in hand, we can note that the Complete Package implies that % is
‘Archimedean’—roughly: no proposition is infinitely more probable than any other—and
furthermore, where propositions P,Q,R are pairwise pseudodisjoint,
1. (P ∪Q) % Q
2. (P ∪Q) ∼ Q ∪ P )
3. (P ∪ (Q ∪R)) ∼ ((P ∪Q) ∪R)
4. P % Q iff (P ∪R) % (Q ∪R)
6Definition 3 implies that every singleton set {P} ∈ B is trivially a ‘set of pseu-
dodisjoint propositions’. This is a feature, not a bug. The rather tortured definition will
be useful later when we generalise away from probability functions.
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Again, this is exactly what comparativists need to draw the analogy with the
measurement of mass. So let’s turn the foregoing mathematical points into a
philosophical theory.
3.3 Precise probabilistic comparativism
Assuming that Cr agrees with α’s confidence ranking, say henceforth that Cr constitutes
a fully adequate model of α’s beliefs whenever
α believes P n/m times as much as she believes Q iff Cr(P ) = n
m
· Cr(Q)
I assume that full adequacy is worth striving for—after all, most theorists will be happy
to make both of the following kinds of inferences:
1. α believes P to degree x, and Q to degree y
2. x = n · y
∴ α believes P n times as much as she believes Q
and in the other direction,
1. α believes P n times as much as Q
2. α believes P to degree y
∴ α believes Q to degree x = n · y
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Only full adequacy licenses inferences in both of these directions, and so I take it that
full adequacy stands as an important desideratum for any comparativist theory. With
that said, we can also say that Cr is L-to-R adequate iff the left-to-right direction of the
above biconditional holds, and R-to-L adequate iff the right-to-left direction holds. A
comparativist may well want to reject full adequacy in favour of mere L-to-R or R-to-L
adequacy, provided that the rejection is well-motivated and they are able to explain
away any intuitions in support of full adequacy. (I’ll say a little more about this in §5.3.)
Next, let precise probabilistic comparativism denote any comparativist theory that’s
committed to the following conditional:
Precise Probabilistic Comparativism. If Cr is the unique probability function
that agrees with α’s confidence ranking, then Cr is a fully adequate model of α’s
beliefs
Note the stated requirement that the probability function be unique. This is needed to
avoid contradiction: for any non-trivial algebra B, there will always be some collection of
probability functions on B that agree with one and the same confidence ranking—and
since any two probability functions on the same domain will disagree on at least some
ratios, any inference from ‘Cr(Q) = n/m · Cr(Q)’ to ‘α believes P n/m times as much as
Q’ will be valid only when the Cr is unique in the relevant sense. In short, R-to-L
adequacy presupposes uniqueness, which in turn requires further constraints on %.
There are multiple ways to ensure uniqueness. Of particular note is the following,
which Stefa´nsson (2016, 2018; cf. also Suppes 1969, 6–7; Savage 1954) uses to ensure
uniqueness in his recent defences of probabilistic comparativism:
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Continuity. For all non-minimal P,Q, there are P ′, Q′ such that P ∼ P ′, Q ∼ Q′, and
P ′ and Q′ are each the union of some subset of a finite set of disjoint propositions
{R1, . . . , Rn} such that Ri ∼ Rj for i, j = 1, . . . , n
The interested reader can see (Krantz et al., 1971, §5.2) and (Fishburn, 1986) for other
conditions sufficient to ensure uniqueness.
Now, probabilistic comparativism clearly has resources to put forward an account of
how a system of confidence comparisons might end up carrying cardinal information, in
the event that % satisfies the requisite axioms. In particular, consider the following
principle, which in essence is just the comparative probability version of how we defined
rational ratio comparisons for mass earlier in §2:7
General Ratio Principle. α believes P n/m times as much as Q if
1. For 0 < n ≤ m, there are m non-minimal, equiprobable pairwise
pseudodisjoint propositions R1, . . . , Rm such that Q ∼ (R1 ∪ · · · ∪Rm) and
P ∼ (R1 ∪ · · · ∪Rn); or
2. α believes P n′/m′ times as much as R, and believes R n′′/m′′ times as much as
Q, where n/m = n′ · n′′/m′ ·m′′
So, for instance, suppose that Q ∩Q′ is minimal. Then, α will take P to be twice as
probable as Q inasmuch as Q ∼ Q′ and (Q ∪Q′) ∼ P . In this case, Q and Q′ are acting
as ‘duplicates’ of one another, and Q ∪Q′ is their ‘concatenation’.
7The first clause of the General Ratio Principle is a close relative of Stefa´nsson’s (2018)
‘Ratio Principle.’ The second (inductive) clause is new—in the context of a condition like
Continuity it’s redundant, but see §4 for it put to work.
18
3.4 Imprecise probabilistic comparativism
Say that Cr confirms the General Ratio Principle (GRP) just in case, whenever that
principle implies that P is believed n/m times as much as Q, then Cr(P ) = n/m · Cr(Q);
otherwise, it disconfirms the GRP. It is easy to check that if any probability function
almost agrees with %, and ∅ is minimal, then that function will confirm the GRP. This
means that it’s possible to extend the account of ratio comparisons just given to
incomplete confidence rankings.
For ordinary agents, the Completeness axiom is widely considered highly
implausible. Consider the following, adapted from (Fishburn, 1986):
P = The global population in 2100 will be greater than 13 billion
Q = The next card drawn from this old and incomplete deck will be a heart
Are you more confident that P than that Q, or less, or just as confident in either? It’s
not clear that there must be a fact of the matter. Similar examples abound.8
There’s a natural way of dealing with incompleteness to which comparativists can
(and do) appeal. Where F is any set of real-valued functions on B, say this time that the
8You don’t have to be convinced by the example, and here is not the place for a detailed
discussion on whether we should expect ‘gaps’ in %. What matters is just that there might
be gaps, and many think that there are. Completeness may or may not be plausible
for perfectly rational agents, but since our focus is on deidealising the usual probabilistic
theory that’s neither here nor there.
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set F agrees with % just in case for all relevant P,Q,
P % Q iff ∀Cr ∈ F : Cr(P ) ≥ Cr(Q)
The idea behind a set-of-functions model is to recapture the structure of the confidence
ranking by doing something like supervaluating over the functions in F—only what’s
common to every such function is treated as having representative import. If P and Q
are incomparable in terms of relative confidence, then F will contain at least one pair of
probability functions that disagree on the relative ordering of P and Q—hence, we still
manage to ‘numerically’ represent incomplete % rankings.
Alon and Lehrer (2014) have shown that a set of probability functions agrees with %
just in case the latter satisfies the Complete Package minus the Completeness
axiom (henceforth: the Non-Complete Package). Furthermore, while there will often
be more than one set of probability functions F that agrees with %, the union of all such
sets will always agree with %. In sum: whenever % satisfies the Non-Complete
Package, there’s guaranteed to be a unique set of probability functions that agrees
with % and which is maximal with respect to inclusion.
Consequently, if we extend the definitions of full / L-to-R / R-to-L adequacy in the
natural way (i.e., by inserting ‘∀Cr ∈ F’ in the appropriate locations), we can
characterise imprecise probabilistic comparativism by its commitment to:
Imprecise Probabilistic Comparativism. If a non-empty set of probability
functions F agrees with α’s confidence ranking and F is maximal with respect to
inclusion, then F is a fully adequate model of α’s beliefs
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Imprecise probabilistic comparativism implies the precise version. More precisely, if we
assume that F and Cr are essentially the same representation whenever F = {Cr}, then
the two varieties of comparativism amount to one and the same thing whenever exactly
one probability function agrees with %.
Furthermore, every Cr in a set F that agrees with % will itself almost agree with %.
So, if we also extend the definition of ‘confirms the GRP’ in the obvious way to sets of
functions, it follows that if a set of probability functions F agrees with %, then F
confirms the GRP. The upshot is that both the precise and imprecise versions of
probabilistic comparativism can extract cardinality from comparative confidences in
basically the same way; the latter is a natural generalisation of the former.
4 Why Generalise?
We’ve seen now that conformity to the Non-Complete Package is sufficient for the
union of pseudodisjoint sets to behave like addition. But it is by no means necessary. It
is possible to weaken those axioms still further while maintaining the analogy, and I
think it is of some importance for comparativism that this can be done. In this section
I’ll say why.
The basic reason is that the axioms of the Non-Complete Package are, in
conjunction, quite strong—it is not likely that they’re jointly satisfied by any ordinary
agents. Since I think it’s especially troubling, I’ll focus on one issue in particular: in the
context of the (individually rather weak) axioms Non-Triviality and
Non-Negativity, Scott’s Axiom immediately generates a probabilistic version of
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the classical problems of logical omniscience. Those three axioms entail that if P ⊆ Q
and P,Q ∈ B, then Q % P . Consequently,
Logical Omniscience. If the worlds in Ω are closed under the consequence relation
⇒, then for all P,Q ∈ B, if P ⇒ Q, then Q % P
That is, any confidence ranking that is (i) defined over propositions taken from a space
of worlds that’s closed under ⇒, and (ii) agrees with a (set of) probability function(s),
will ipso facto be ‘coherent’ with respect to ⇒ in the manner just described. In §3.1 it
was assumed that ⇒ is at least as strong as the consequence relation we find in classical
propositional logic, and it’s implausible that ordinary agents’ confidence rankings are
everywhere and always coherent with respect to that logic. I’ll say more about that in a
moment. But the point can also be put in a much more general way: we are (probably)
not omniscient with respect to any very interesting logics, so unless ⇒ is extremely weak
indeed, the confidence rankings of any ordinary agents will (probably) falsify at least one
of Non-Triviality, Non-Negativity, or Scott’s Axiom.
How might a comparativist respond to this fact? Four obvious (but also obviously
non-exhaustive) options are:
1. Argue that ordinary agents’ comparative confidences do conform to the
Non-Complete Package after all, because they are probabilistically coherent
after all.
2. Argue that ordinary agents’ comparative confidences do conform to the
Non-Complete Package after all, once we define propositions over a richer
space of worlds.
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3. Argue that because ordinary agents’ comparative confidences do not conform to
the Non-Complete Package, they therefore do not ground any cardinal
information (or not the same kind of information).
4. Accept that ordinary agents’ comparative confidences do not conform to the
Non-Complete Package, and seek weaker axioms under which cardinality can
be extracted from comparative confidences.
The fourth seems to me clearly the best option. After all, nothing about comparativism
per se ties it irrevocably to specifically probabilistic representations of degrees of belief,
and if more general conditions exist then it only makes sense for comparativists to find
and use them. But if you prefer one of the others, or something else not listed, then so be
it—there’s no harm in developing ideas in many different directions. I will, however, here
give some reasons to think that the fourth option should be preferred.
Regarding the first: I will take it for granted in the following discussion that we are
not (classically) logically omniscient. “But maybe we are!”—Sure, and I’m not
unsympathetic to the idea that we ordinary agents really are probabilistically coherent.
But since this is usually met with an incredulous stare let’s just move on already.
The second option seems to be the more common way of arguing that the
Non-Complete Package can actually be satisfied by ordinary (and ordinarily
irrational) agents. As I’ve noted, if the entailment relation ⇒ is weak enough, then
logical omniscience might not look so bad. So what would happen if we remove the
assumption that the worlds in Ω are closed under any interesting logic?
In a little more detail, the idea is this. If we help ourselves to a rich enough space of
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possible and impossible worlds, then it’s well-known that we can construct a probability
function properly so-called on that enriched space that ‘mimics’ the behaviour of a
non-probabilistic function defined over the smaller space of classical possible worlds.9 So
what looks like comparative confidences that are inconsistent with Non-Triviality,
Non-Negativity, and/or Scott’s Axiom when they’re defined for propositions qua
sets of possible worlds, can in fact be re-represented using (sets of) probability functions,
if we make use of enough impossible worlds. Hence, to apply the probabilistic
comparativists’ explanation of cardinality to ordinary agents, we don’t need to weaken
the axioms all. We can keep the the Non-Complete Package as long as we just make
sure to use enough impossible worlds.
That seems easy enough, but I do not think that this is a viable strategy for the
comparativist to adopt. I’ll set out the reasons for this very briefly, since most of the
relevant issues are discussed at length in (Elliott 2019b). The problem is that once Ω
includes enough impossible worlds for the strategy to work (roughly: for any
impossibility, there’s an impossible world that verifies it), then most subsets of Ω will be
meaningless and consequently not representative of any proper contents of belief.
Moreover, for any meaningful subset P of Ω, none of P ’s subsets or supersets will be
meaningful, and nor will any subset of Ω \ P be meaningful. In short, having too many
9Where Ω is the space of classically possible worlds, B ⊆ ℘(Ω), and Cr : B 7→ [0, 1],
then if Ω+ is a rich enough extension of Ω into the space of impossible worlds, there’s a
probability function Cr+ on an algebra of sets B+ ⊆ ℘(Ω+) such that Cr+ assigns x to the
subset of Ω+ that verifies ϕ iff Cr assigns x to the subset of Ω that verifies ϕ. See (Cozic,
2006), (Halpern and Pucella, 2011), and (Elliott 2019b).
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impossible worlds in Ω renders useless for the purposes of comparativism any
set-theoretic definition of ‘concatenation’ along the lines described in §3. Furthermore,
any algebra of propositions defined on a space of possible and impossible worlds that’s
rich enough to represent the contents of belief will contain only meaningful propositions
just when the relevant space of worlds is closed under a consequence relation that is, for
all intents and purposes, at least as strong as classical propositional logic.
(Of course, comparativists don’t have to define their concatenations set-theoretically
as I have done in §3.2. But the only other place that we will plausibly find the structure
required to defined up an appropriate concatenation operation is in the logical relations
amongst the contents of the propositions. That is, we could define concatenations in
terms of disjunctions of inconsistent contents (or disjunctions of contents whose
conjunctions are minimal). But defining the concatenation operation in this way brings
us straight back to where we started vis-a`-vis to the problem of logical omniscience, and
appealing to impossible worlds will be of absolutely no help here.)
So there’s no easy way to pursue either the first or the second route: if you want to
tie the possibility of cardinality to the Non-Complete Package, then you’ll be tying
it to very strong conditions of logical omniscience—and consequently you’ll need to face
up to the empirical and intuitive evidence that ordinary agents just aren’t that good at
classical logic.
Could we instead take the third route, and argue that ordinary agents whose
comparative confidences don’t satisfy the Non-Complete Package cannot have
beliefs which carry ratio and interval information? This doesn’t strike me as very
plausible. For example, the literature on the conjunction and disjunction fallacies already
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strongly suggests that ordinary agents do not have comparative confidences that respect
even relatively simple bits of classical logic. So imagine that α has just committed the
conjunction fallacy—she thinks it’s more plausible that Linda is a bank teller (B) and
active in the feminist movement (F ) than that she’s a bank teller. Are we going to say
now that there’s no meaningful way to answer the question of how much more α believes
B ∩ F over B? Of course not. Similarly, I am not logically omniscient, and (like most
people) I’ve probably fallen foul of various probabilistic fallacies before. My comparative
confidences don’t satisfy the Non-Complete Package. Maybe they don’t even come
close to satisfying those axioms. None of this prevents me from believing some things
much more than other things, or at least twice as much as other things.
Our capacity to believe one proposition much more than another, or (at least) twice
as much as another thing, etc., is not hostage to any presupposition of logical coherence,
still less should it depend on a condition of probabilistic representability. Most
philosophers will see no inconsistencies at all in holding both that (a) ordinary agents’
beliefs cannot be faithfully represented by (a set of) probability functions, and (b) for
arbitrary P and Q, an ordinary agent might believe P much more than Q, or (at least)
twice as much as Q. These claims should be uncontroversial—only someone caught
firmly in the grips of a deeply unrealistic picture of belief would think to deny it. Or at
least I’ll say this: if you want to argue otherwise, then you’ll be facing a difficult uphill
battle. Better, I think, to seek more general axioms under which cardinal information
can be extracted from a system of comparative confidences.
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5 The Ramseyan Alternatives
What I’m calling Ramseyan comparativism is inspired by a brief remark from Frank
Ramsey in ‘Probability and Partial Belief’: “Well, I believe it to an extent 2/3’, i.e. (this
at least is the most natural interpretation) ‘I have the same degree of belief in it as in
P ∨Q when I think P,Q,R equally likely and know that exactly one of them is true’.’
(Ramsey 1929, 256.) In a recent paper, Weatherson (2016, pp. 223–4) has also suggested
that Ramsey’s remark points towards a version of comparativism that’s weaker than
probabilistic comparativism. However, neither Ramsey nor Weatherson take their
discussion beyond this initial suggestion, and (as we’ll soon see) there’s a bit of work
that needs to be done in order to flesh the idea out in full.
In the remainder of this paper, I will develop precise Ramseyan comparativism
(§§5.1–5.2), and then an imprecise version (§5.3). Following that, I will prove an
important result about the axioms under which Ramseyan comparativism supports the
analogy with the measurement of mass (§5.4).
5.1 The Main Ideas
First, it’ll be useful to introduce another definition (the term ‘n-scale’ comes from
Koopman 1940):
Definition 4. A set P of n pseudodisjoint propositions is an n-scale of P iff (i) P /∈ P,
(ii)
⋃
P ∼ P , and (iii) for all Q,Q′ in P, Q ∼ Q′
We can take this as a comparativist characterisation of what it is for an agent to think
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that Q is as likely as a disjunction of equiprobable propositions at most one of which is
true. So, e.g., if α thinks Q is as likely as P ∪ P ′, where P and P ′ are equiprobable and
pseudodisjoint, then {P, P ′} is a 2-scale of Q. We’ll also assume that α is certain of P ’s
truth just in case P is maximal, and we’ll represent certainty in P with Cr(P ) = 1. This
is something the Ramseyan view shares with probabilistic comparativism, where in order
to fix the scales the values of the minimal and maximal propositions need to be
stipulated.
In light of Definition 4, Ramsey’s idea can be recast as: α believes P to degree
n/m when P ∼ (Q1 ∪ · · · ∪Qn), where the Q1, . . . , Qn belong to an m-scale
{Q1, . . . , Qn, . . . , Qm} of some maximal proposition R. A good start—but there’s a
natural extension that will be helpful to incorporate into what follows.
Consider, to begin with, the following situation. Let B designate the powerset of
Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3}, and let P〈n〉 and P〈nm〉 designate the possible worlds propositions {ωn}
and {ωn, ωm} respectively. (For example, P〈12〉 = {ω1, ω2}.) Suppose now that % is
transitive and reflexive, and (where the square brackets indicate equiprobability):
Ω 
P〈13〉
P〈23〉
 
P〈12〉
P〈3〉
 
P〈1〉
P〈2〉
  ∅
We can represent % with Figure 1, where the relative sizes of the boxes containing the ωi
correspond to the order of propositions in the confidence ranking:
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ω1 ω2
ω3
Figure 1: Indirect R-scalability
Now Ω is maximal, and {P〈12〉, P〈3〉} is a 2-scale of Ω, so Ramsey would say that
Cr(P〈3〉) = Cr(P〈12〉) = 1/2
However, P〈1〉 and P〈2〉 don’t belong to any n-scale of Ω, so Ramsey’s idea doesn’t yet
give us any strength with which they’re believed. But since {P〈1〉, P〈2〉} is a 2-scale of
P〈12〉, it’s only reasonable to say that
Cr(P〈1〉) = Cr(P〈2〉) = 1/4
We can capture the foregoing by means of the following:
Definition 5. For integers n,m such that m ≥ n ≥ 0, m > 0, P is
1. 0/m-valued if P is minimal and m/m-valued if P is maximal, and
2. n/m-valued if P ∼ (Q1 ∪ · · · ∪Qn′), where the Q1, . . . , Qn′ belong to an
m′-scale of an n′′/m′′-valued proposition, and n′ · n′′/m′ ·m′′ = n/m
The new, generalised version of Ramsey’s idea now amounts to the claim that α believes
P to degree n/m if P is n/m-valued. As such, define a Ramsey function as follows:
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Definition 6. Cr : B 7→ [0, 1] is a Ramsey function (relative to %) iff, for all P ∈ B, if
P is n/m-valued, then Cr(P ) = n/m
The close connection between Ramsey functions and the GRP should at this point be
apparent, and it should likewise already be clear that the way Ramsey proposes to
measure degrees of belief isn’t too different from the strategy the probabilistic
comparativists want to adopt. In fact, in the present terminology, the first
(non-inductive) clause of the GRP essentially states that for m ≥ n, P is believed n/m
times as much as Q whenever P is an m-scale of Q, and P′ ⊆ P is an n-scale of P . In
this case, for any Ramsey function Cr, Cr(P ) = n/m · Cr(Q). With respect to n/m-valued
propositions, Ramsey functions always confirm the GRP.
Essentially, a Ramsey function either directly or indirectly scales every middling
n/m-valued proposition relative to some maximal proposition, which has a stipulated
value. With respect to pairs of propositions that cannot be so scaled, however, a Ramsey
function may disconfirm the GRP. An especially clear example where this would occur
can be seen in Figure 2:
ω1
ω2
ω3
Figure 2: Failure of R-scalability
Where
Ω  P〈23〉 
P〈12〉
P〈13〉
 
P〈2〉
P〈3〉
  P〈1〉  ∅
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In this case, the only non-trivial n-scale is the 2-scale {P〈2〉, P〈3〉} of P〈23〉. According to
the GRP, then, we should be able to say:
Cr(P〈2〉) = Cr(P〈3〉) = 1/2 · Cr(P〈23〉)
However, since P〈23〉 can’t be scaled relative to Ω, Ramsey’s suggestion gives us no means
of fixing values for P〈2〉, P〈3〉 and P〈23〉.
Call any proposition that’s n/m-valued R-scalable. All of the propositions other than
Ω and ∅ in Figure 2 are not R-scalable. Ramsey says nothing about how to measure
propositions that aren’t R-scalable—though perhaps this is not a very troubling gap in
his proposal. One might simply assume that such cases don’t exist. Let N designate the
set of R-scalable propositions, then:
R-Scalability. N = B
R-Scalability is not implied by the Complete Package. However, given that
package, it is equivalent to Continuity. (See the appendix for a proof.)10 In other
words, precise probabilistic comparativists don’t seem to have anything to fear from an
axiom like R-Scalability. (Nevertheless, I’ll discuss below how the Ramseyan
comparativist can do without it.)
R-Scalability merely guarantees that every proposition in B is R-scalable.
Importantly, this isn’t yet enough to ground a minimally plausible comparativist theory.
There are still two additional problems that can arise in the absence of further
10The proof rests in part on the assumption that B is closed under unions. Without
that assumption, Continuity will imply R-Scalability but not vice versa.
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assumptions about the structure of %:
1. We need to ensure that Definition 6 is consistent. Without further assumptions,
it’s possible that, e.g., P ∼ Q, where for some R, P belongs to a 2-scale of R and
Q belongs to a 3-scale of R. This is clearly unacceptable: α can’t believe P to the
degrees 1/2 and 1/3 simultaneously! If Ramsey functions are to be well-defined, we’ll
need to ensure that if P is both n/m-valued and n′/m′-valued, then n/m = n′/m′.
2. We need to ensure that any Ramsey function relative to % will agree with %.
Without further assumptions, there’s no guarantee that Cr(P ) ≥ Cr(Q) if or only
if P % Q. For instance, P could be 1/2-valued, and Q 1/4-valued, yet Q % P . This is
also undesirable: if the order of the values we assign propositions don’t match up to
the confidence ranking, then there can be no plausible sense in which those values
are a measure of the strengths with which those propositions are believed.
In the presence of R-Scalability, we can kill these two birds with a single stone by
adding the following rather strong axiom:
R-Coherence. If P is n/m-valued and Q is n′/m′-valued, P % Q iff n/m ≥ n′/m′
R-Coherence is sufficient to avoid both worries, as established by the following
representation theorem:
Theorem 1. (i) % satisfies R-Coherence iff there exists a Ramsey function Cr with
respect to %, and (ii) % also satisfies R-Scalability iff Cr is the unique Ramsey
function relative to % that agrees with %.
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The proofs for this theorem and the two that follow below can be found in the
appendix.
5.2 Precise Ramseyan Comparativism
We will say from now on that one accepts precise Ramseyan comparativism just in case
they accept the following conditional:
Precise Ramseyan Comparativism. If Cr is the only Ramsey function relative to
α’s confidence ranking, then Cr is a fully adequate model of α’s beliefs
We can now characterise precisely the respects in which precise Ramseyan
comparativism is more lenient than probabilistic comparativism. To start with, it’s easy
to see that R-Coherence is implied already by the Complete Package. Indeed, if
any probability function Cr agrees with %, then Cr is also a Ramsey function relative to
%. Moreover, where the Complete Package plus R-Scalability holds, then the
unique probability function that agrees with % just is the unique Ramsey function that
agrees with %. This is important, since (in light of what we said earlier) it means that
precise Ramseyan comparativism is a generalisation of any version of precise
probabilistic comparativism that makes use of Continuity.
In the other direction, R-Scalability and R-Coherence together obviously
imply Completeness and Preorder. However, they don’t imply any of
Non-Triviality, Non-Negativity, or Scott’s Axiom. For a simple (albeit
extreme) example where all three of those axioms fail, assume that Ω = {w1, w2, w3, w4},
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% is transitive and reflexive, and:

P〈4〉
P〈24〉
P〈124〉
P〈234〉



∅
Ω
P〈23〉
P〈34〉



P〈2〉
P〈14〉
P〈123〉
 

P〈1〉
P〈3〉
P〈12〉
P〈13〉
P〈134〉

It’s straightforward (albeit a little tedious) to check that R-Scalability and
R-Coherence are satisfied in this case. The only non-trivial n-scales (i.e., n > 1) that
can be defined using this ranking are:
1. The 2-scale {P〈23〉, P〈34〉} of the maximal propositions
2. The 2-scale {P〈123〉, P〈14〉} of ∅, Ω, P〈23〉, and P〈34〉
3. The several n-scales composed out of minimal propositions, each of some other
minimal proposition
Consequently, Cr(Ω) = Cr(∅) = 1/2 because {Ω} and {∅} are 1-scales of P〈23〉 and P〈34〉,
where the latter are 1/2-valued; and Cr(P〈2〉) = 1/4, because {P〈2〉} is a 1-scale of P〈14〉 and
P〈123〉, where the latter are 1/4-valued. Every other proposition is either maximal or
minimal, and assigned either 1 or 0 accordingly. That the example violates
Non-Triviality, Non-Negativity is obvious; to see that it violates Scott’s Axiom
it suffices to consider the two short sequences P〈13〉, P〈24〉 and P〈12〉, P〈34〉.
The interesting ‘work’ here is of course being done entirely by R-Coherence. This
axiom imposes a limited kind of additive structure on %, specifically with respect to
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confidence rankings between propositions constructed out of members of the same
n-scale of any n′/m′-valued proposition. Roughly: within an n-scale, % behaves
“pseudo-probabilistically”—but not every proposition is constructible out of the members
of an appropriate n-scale, and across n-scales % can behave quite irrationally indeed.
5.3 Imprecise Ramseyan comparativism
If we wanted to drop R-Scalability out of the picture, we could do so by adopting a
set-of-functions representation of %. For that, we will need to add back in the
Preorder axiom. This is obviously necessary for any real-valued function or set
thereof to agree with %, and it is not implied by R-Coherence alone.
Theorem 2. % satisfies Preorder and R-Coherence iff there is a nonempty set F
of Ramsey functions relative to % such that F agrees with %, and in such cases
there will also be a unique such F that agrees with % that’s maximal with respect to
inclusion.
Given this, let’s characterise the imprecise variety of Ramseyan comparativism by
its commitment to:
Imprecise Ramseyan Comparativism. If F is a non-empty set of Ramsey functions
with respect to α’s confidence ranking, which is maximal with respect to inclusion
and agrees with %, then F is an R-to-L adequate model of α’s beliefs
Note that imprecise Ramseyan comparativism only claims R-to-L adequacy. This is
because (as we’ve seen) Preorder and R-Coherence are not sufficient for a (set of)
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Ramsey function(s) to confirm the GRP in full. This is a limitation with the imprecise
Ramseyan comparativist’s theory, but perhaps not a devastating one. In effect, R-to-L
adequacy says that we won’t go wrong whenever we read cardinal information off of the
numbers, though there may be some interesting cardinal properties to one’s degrees of
belief that aren’t appropriately captured by their cardinal representation. Although it’s
not perfect, I suspect that many comparativists would be satisfied by this
result—nobody said that our numerical representations had to be perfect after all.
Imprecise Ramseyan comparativism also agrees exactly with (precise and imprecise)
probabilistic comparativism whenever the Complete Package plus R-Scalability
are satisfied. We’ve already shown that this is so for precise Ramseyan comparativism,
but if this is not obvious in the case of imprecise Ramseyan comparativism then
consider: if we assume the Complete Package plus R-Scalability, then the
probability function Cr that agrees with % is the Ramsey function that agrees with %;
from imprecise Ramseyan comparativism, Cr is R-to-L adequate, so Cr determines a
unique ratio comparison for every pair of non-minimal propositions; and finally, α cannot
believe P n/m times as much as Q and n′/m′ as much as Q, for n/m 6= n′/m′.
5.4 The importance of R-Coherence
Importantly, we can show that Preorder and R-Coherence are individually
necessary for coherence with the GRP.
As far as Preorder is concerned, this is obvious for the reasons already
mentioned. The more interesting result concerns R-Coherence. Given some very
minimal scaling assumptions, violations of that axiom imply that any Cr that agrees
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with % cannot confirm the GRP:
Theorem 3. If (i) Cr agrees with %, (ii) there are P,Q such that P  Q, and (iii)
Cr(R) = 0 whenever R is minimal, then Cr confirms the GRP only if
R-Coherence is satisfied.
Corollary: under the same assumptions, mutatis mutandis, any set of real-valued
functions F will confirm the GRP only if R-Coherence is satisfied.
In other words, assuming just that % has some non-trivial structure, and that
minimal propositions can be assigned value 0, that a function (or set of functions)
confirms the GRP implies that any comparative ranking it agrees with will satisfy
Preorder and R-Coherence. Thus we have found two minimal axioms necessary for
the union of pseudodisjoint sets to behave like addition with respect to %.
6 Conclusion
Let’s take stock. The standard comparativist strategy for explaining cardinality is based
on a purported analogy with the measurement of certain extensive quantities like length
or mass. So, for instance, to say that P is n times more likely than Q, we just need to be
able to say that P is as likely as the union of n ‘duplicates’ of Q, where the ‘duplicates’
are propositions that are equiprobable and pairwise (pseudo)disjoint. The two Ramseyan
varieties of comparativism I’ve outlined offer an account of when this kind of ‘adding’ is
meaningful that generalises the axioms assumed by the more common probabilistic
comparativism, thus applying to a wide range of confidence rankings that aren’t
probabilistically representable.
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In particular, we’ve shown that comparativists can in principle do without any
appeal to Non-Triviality, Non-Negativity, and Scott’s Axiom, and can avoid
the problems that those axioms bring in their wake. This is an interesting result by itself,
since it establishes that comparativists can preserve their favourite explanation of
cardinality without necessarily committing to the stronger conditions required for
probabilistic representability. Moreover, we have been able to show that the union of
(pseudo)disjoint sets behaves like addition only if the comparative confidence ranking
satisfies Preorder and R-Coherence. Inasmuch as comparativists want to retain the
analogy with the measurement and mass as it’s usually understood—i.e., in terms of the
union of either disjoint or pseudodisjoint propositions—then Ramseyan comparativism is
as general as it gets.
It remains to be seen whether it’s correct to say that an agent α considers P to be n
times more likely than Q if and only if P is as likely for her as the union of n
pseudodisjoint duplicates of Q. But we now know the minimal conditions required for
the analogy with mass to hold, so we can ask: (a) are Preorder and R-Coherence
plausibly satisfied by actual agents—or at least, by the kinds of agents whom we are
happy to say have degrees of belief which carry cardinal information? And, (b) if so, does
the GRP in those cases accurately predict our considered judgements about the degrees
of belief of such agents? These are questions that I’ve not considered in this paper, but
they will need careful consideration in future discussions on the viability of the
comparativist view.
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Appendix: Proofs
A. Proof that, given the Complete Package, Continuity is equivalent to
R-Scalability:
Assume the Complete Package throughout.
For the left-to-right, assume Continuity. This entails that for every middling
proposition P , P ∼ (Q1 ∪ · · · ∪Qn), where the Q1, . . . , Qn belong to some m-scale of Ω,
which gives us R-Scalability.
For the right-to-left, assume R-Scalability, and (for reductio) that there exists a
non-minimal atom A in the algebra B such that for every other atom A′, A′ % A, with
‘%’ replaced by ‘’ in at least one instance. (Equivalently: assume there are non-minimal
atoms not equally ranked by %).
Since Ω \ A is middling, it’s R-scalable only if (Ω \ A) ∼ (Q1 ∪ · · · ∪Qn), for some
Q1, . . . , Qn in an m-scale of some R-scalable proposition S such that S  (Ω \ A).11
However, let Cr be any probability function that agrees with %; then
Cr(Q1) + · · ·+ Cr(Qn) = Cr(Ω)− Cr(A)
Furthermore, the Qi must be more probable than A, since as there exist atoms more
probable than A the union of any and all propositions that are as probable as A will be
11We can safely ignore the case where S ∼ (Ω \A), since then S will be R-scalable only
if Ω \ A is.
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strictly less probable than Ω \ A. So, Cr(Qi) > Cr(A), and thus
Cr(Q1) + · · ·+ Cr(Qn) + · · ·+ Cr(Qm) > Cr(Ω)
But there’s no S  Ω, so Ω \ A is not R-scalable, contradicting our assumption.
R-Scalability therefore implies that A ∼ A′ for any two non-minimal atoms A and A′;
from this, Continuity straightforwardly follows.
B. Proof of Theorem 1:
Part (i): For the left-to-right, assume R-Coherence. If P is n/m-valued and
n′/m′-valued, then n/m = n′/m′. So there exists a function Cr that assigns to each P ∈N a
unique rational value in [0, 1], and Cr will be a Ramsey-function relative to % on N. This
function can then be extended to the whole of B in the event that B−N 6= ∅ in any
way you like. The right-to-left is obvious.
Part (ii): For the left-to-right, assume R-Coherence and R-Scalability. For any
P,Q ∈ N (= B), suppose first that P % Q. Where P is n/m-valued and Q is n′/m′-valued,
n/m ≥ n′/m′; so for any Ramsey-function Cr relative to %, Cr(P ) ≥ Cr(Q). Next, suppose
Cr(P ) ≥ Cr(Q); since Cr is a Ramsey function, P is n/m-valued and Q is n′/m′-valued, for
n/m ≥ n′/m′; by R-Coherence, therefore P % Q. So from R-Coherence and
R-Scalability, there is a Ramsey-function Cr relative to % that agrees with %. It is
obvious from the definitions that the restriction of Cr to N will always be the unique
Ramsey function relative to % on N, and in this case N = B.
For the right-to-left, the existence of the Ramsey-function Cr already entails
R-Coherence by part (i). That its uniqueness condition also entails R-Scalability is
40
obvious given the finitude of B.
C. Proof of Theorem 2:
The right-to-left of the existence part is obvious given part (i) of Theorem 1.
For the left-to-right of the existence part, assume henceforth Preorder and
R-Coherence. We focus on the case where N ⊂ B, as R-Scalability trivialises the
proof.
From Preorder, at least one nonempty set F = {fi : B 7→ R | i = 1, . . . , n} exists
that agrees with %. (See Evren and Ok 2011, p. 556, Proposition 1.) Suppose that F is
maximal with respect to inclusion. We then just need that there’s some nonempty
F∗ ⊆ F such that F∗ also agrees with % and ∀f ∈ F∗, f has an order-preserving
transformation f ′ that’s a Ramsey function w.r.t. %. (We’ll say that f ′ is an
order-preserving transformation of f just in case f(P ) ≥ f(Q) iff f ′(P ) ≥ f ′(Q).) The
set of all such transformations f ′ will then agree with %.
There are three cases to consider: (i) N is empty; (ii) N contains only the minimal
and/or maximal elements of B; (iii) N contains some middling propositions. The first
two are straightforward and omitted. For the third, note that if F agrees with % and
P  Q, then
1. f(P ) ≥ f(Q) for all f ∈ F
2. f(P ) > f(Q) for some, but not all, f ∈ F
For P,Q ∈ N, R-Coherence requires however that for any Ramsey function Cr, if
P  Q, then Cr(P ) > Cr(Q); consequently, it’s not true that if F agrees with %, then
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every f ∈ F has an order-preserving transformation that’s also a Ramsey function with
respect to %. But define F∗ as follows:
F? = {f ∈ F | if P,Q ∈ N and P  Q, then f(P ) > f(Q)}
F? will be non-empty, and will agree with %. Let FN denote the set of restrictions of
every f ∈ F? to N; given this, the unique Ramsey function (denoted CrN) on N is going
to be an order-preserving transformation of every f ∈ FN . So we just have to show that
each f ∈ F? has an order-preserving transformation bounded by 0 and 1 that’s an
extension of CrN from N to the whole of B. Since B is finite this is straightforward.
The proof of the uniqueness condition is obvious: if F and F′ both agree with %,
then F ∪F′ will too.
D. Proof of Theorem 3:
Suppose just that Cr agrees with % and that % violates R-Coherence. So, there exist
P,Q such that P is n/m-valued, Q is n′/m′-valued, and not:
(P % Q)↔ (n/m ≥ n′/m′)
There are three cases: (1) neither P nor Q is minimal; (2) both P and Q are minimal; or
(3) exactly one of P or Q is minimal.
Start with case (1). Focus on P , and let max designate some maximal proposition.
(If P is n/m-valued and non-minimal, then max exists.) P is either (i) as probable as the
union of n members of an m-scale of max , or (ii) as probable as the union of n′′ members
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of an m′′-scale of . . . the union of n′′′ members of an m′′′-scale of max . If (i), Cr confirms
the GRP only if
Cr(P ) = n/m · Cr(max )
If (ii), only if
Cr(P ) = (n′′ · · · · · n′′′)/(m′′ · · · · ·m′′′) · Cr(max ) = n/m · Cr(max )
The same applies to Q, mutatis mutandis, so Cr confirms the GRP only if
Cr(Q) = n′/m′ · Cr(max )
Assume for reductio that Cr confirms the GRP, and suppose n/m ≥ n′/m′. Hence,
Cr(P ) ≥ Cr(Q), and therefore P % Q. In the other direction, suppose P % Q; so
Cr(P ) ≥ Cr(Q), and n/m ≥ n′/m′. So,
(P % Q)↔ (n/m ≥ n′/m′),
which violates our assumptions.
Now case (2). Assume for this case that there are P,Q ∈ B such that P  Q, and
that if P is minimal, then Cr(P ) = 0. If P,Q are both minimal then P ∼ Q, and if Cr
agrees with % then Cr(P ) = Cr(Q) > Cr(R), for any R such that R 6∼ P (and hence
R  P ). Since P,Q are 0/m-valued by definition, R-Coherence is violated only if P or
Q is also n/m-valued, for n > 0. Suppose this of P ; then by the earlier reasoning, Cr
confirms the GRP only if Cr(P ) = n/m · Cr(max ). Since n/m > 0 and Cr(max ) > 0, this is
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false; so Cr disconfirms the GRP.
Case (3) is then straightforward, and the proof of the corollary (for sets of
functions) follows the same structure. Both proofs are omitted.
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